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Abstract 
This paper investigates the long-run relationship between tax structure and economic growth and the other economic 
indicators via panel unit root tests and panel cointegration analysis. Panel unit root tests are carried out to determine the 
order of integration of panel variables. In order to find out the long-run cointegration relationship, we employ the Kao 
residual cointegration test. The results of panel cointegration test reveal that there is no long-run cointegrating relationship 
between tax structure and both of GDP and gross saving (SAVING) in developing countries. Yet, there is an evidence of a 
strong cointegrating relationship among tax structure and international trade’s activities. Conversely, for high-income 
OECD countries, Kao’s test suggests that there is a long-run cointegrating relationship between components of tax 
revenue and GDP and gross saving, while there is no evidence for imported and exported of goods and services 
(international trade). 
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1. Introduction 
For the past decades, the issue and debate of taxation and long-run growth has attracted the attention of 
many researchers in the different areas of studies. Empirical studies conducted by Stokey and Rebello, 1995, 
and Mendoza et al., 1997, revealed that tax policy has small effect on long-run growth. On the other hand, 
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Bleaney et al., 2001, expressed that both of income and consumption taxes have a clear effect on economic 
growth in the long-run. 
The literature has witnessed that taxation also affect the other important economic indicators. Avila and 
Strauch, 2008, who implemented the endogenous growth model revealed that taxation had negative impact on 
investment and led to slowdown the economic growth. Using pooled time series and cross-sectional analyses 
in South and East Asian, Kerr and Monsigh, (1998a), argued that there is a significant inverse relationship 
between tax-mix (direct and indirect taxes) and the level of saving. More recently, Berger and Everaert, 2010, 
measured the impact of labor taxes on unemployment in 16 OECD countries and divided the countries into 
European, Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries. They concluded that labor taxes have positive relationship with 
unemployment in European and Nordic countries. However, they did not find any evidence to relate labor 
taxes and unemployment in Anglo-Saxon. 
Hence, two important issues are addressed in this study; (1) Do taxes have a long-run relationship with 
economic growth and the other economic indicators? (2) Is the long-run relationship between tax revenue and 
economic indicators is consistent among developing and high-income OECD countries? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses theoretically how taxes affect the 
economic growth by adopting the growth model. Section 3 describes the data and methodology employed in 
this study. Section 4 provides results of unit root and cointegration analyses for both developing and high-
income OECD countries. The last section concludes. 
2. Taxes in the growth model 
The neoclassical growth model which was introduced by Solow, 1956, suggested that the long-run growth 
rate is driven by the rate of technical progress and population growth. The incentive to invest in human or 
physical capital may be affected by productive government expenditures or distortionary taxation. However, 
in the long run, this affects only the equilibrium factor ratios but not the growth rate. On the other hand, 
endogenous growth models which was introduced by Barro, 1990, and King and Rebelo, 1990, predicted that 
the long run growth will be affected by productive expenditures and distortionary taxation. Roháč, 2009, 
illustrated the growth rate of an economy as follows: 
iiiiii mky PED                       (1) 
where yi on the left side represent the change in output as fraction of GDP, ki donates the change in the 
capital stock as a fraction of GDP and mi is the percentage change in workforce or employee overtime. The 
residual, μi stands for the overall change in economic productivity, while both αi and βi measure the marginal 
productivity of capital and the elasticity of labour. 
Engen and Skinner, 1996, proposed five ways on how taxes can influence the economic performance. The 
first assumption is investment, ki can be reduced by imposing taxes on income, corporate and capital gains. 
Secondly, working hours or workforce participation, mi also will be influenced by the change in these taxes. 
Third, taxation will give negative impact on the productivity growth, μi by attenuating the venture capital 
investment to high technology industries and research and development. The fourth way how taxes can 
influence the movement of growth is the marginal productivity of capital, αi can be influenced by taxes if the 
firm change the investments from highly taxed to low tax investment while finally, taxation can reduce 
marginal productivity of labour, βi by discouraging labours from working in high productivity sectors but 
more tax burden. 
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3. Data and methodology 
Our sample consists of balanced panel data for 24 developing countries and 24 high-income OECD 
countries over the period 2000-2009 (early of the modern era). All data are gathered from World Bank 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012). The rate of change in a country’s GDP (GDP), gross saving 
(SAVING), net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), imports and exports of goods and services 
(IMPORT and EXPORT) and unemployment rates (UNEMP) are the economic indicators chosen by this 
study. 
The independent variables consists of primary sources of tax revenue which includes the total tax revenue 
to GDP ratio (TAX), taxes on incomes, profits and capital gains (INCOMETX), taxes on goods and services 
(GOODTX), taxes on international trade (INTERTX), other taxes (OTHERTX) and highest marginal tax rates 
(MTR). We follow the measurement of these variables by Gober and Burns (1997) and Widmalm (2001) 
which divides tax structure with total tax revenue (TAX). However, due to avoid the bias towards finding a 
cointegration relationship, MTR is not divided with TAX. The summary statistics of variables for developing 
and high-income OECD countries is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of variables in levels (2000-2009) 
Variables Groups of countries Observations Mean (%) Min (%) Max (%) Std. Dev. 
GDP 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
4.97 
2.42 
-17.96 
-13.90 
14.20 
10.56 
4.1210 
3.2888 
FDI 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
4.37 
19.66 
-2.76 
-15.03 
31.38 
524.88 
4.2772 
72.7463 
SAVING 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
22.42 
21.96 
1.73 
0.15 
53.48 
39.81 
8.2338 
6.0160 
IMPORT 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
43.01 
48.42 
11.18 
13.50 
100.60 
143.63 
21.8967 
25.3569 
EXPORT 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
38.27 
50.29 
9.98 
9.39 
119.81 
175.93 
20.3378 
30.4090 
UNEMP 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
9.04 
6.81 
1.30 
1.80 
19.90 
19.90 
3.8131 
3.2391 
INCOMETX 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
22.68 
28.99 
1.60 
8.06 
51.27 
66.72 
11.6060 
12.8327 
GOODTX 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
36.99 
27.84 
14.99 
2.44 
79.46 
47.15 
11.6035 
8.5400 
INTERTX 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
6.21 
1.04 
-16.19 
-0.03 
22.19 
5.17 
5.1009 
1.2243 
OTHERTX 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
2.83 
2.77 
-2.83 
0.01 
15.17 
10.36 
2.9970 
2.0245 
MTR 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
28.67 
29.86 
10.00 
12.50 
55.00 
51.60 
8.0497 
6.9508 
TAX 
 
Developing 
High-income OECD 
240 
240 
14.67 
20.39 
6.82 
8.28 
27.57 
35.77 
4.0336 
5.4001 
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3.1 Data on tax structure and economic indicators in developing vs. high-income OECD countries 
Table 1 compares the sources of tax revenue and economic indicators among both of countries. To begin 
with, as seen in the Table, the developing countries shows greater economic performance compared with the 
high-income OECD countries, as measured by the annual growth rate of GDP. It indicates that, even though 
most of the high-income countries have the advanced technologies and high standard of living, but recently, 
they failed to generate better economic growth. Nevertheless, the high-income OECD countries succeed on 
collecting the larger tax revenue compared with the developing countries. As shown in the Table, the high-
income OECD countries collect more than double collected of the total tax revenue in the developing 
countries, as a fraction of GDP. It proves that the high-income OECD countries have the highest per capita 
income and many big companies with large profits to be taxed compared with developing countries. 
Among the high-income OECD countries, the main sources of tax revenue are the taxes on incomes, 
profits and capital gains (28.99 per cent of total tax revenue) and taxes on goods and services (27.84 per cent 
of total tax revenue). Taxes on goods and services are even more important among developing countries 
(36.99 per cent of total tax revenue). Recently, developing and high-income OECD countries have 
encouraged the activities on imports and exports. Both groups of countries have reduced the barriers on 
international trade by implement the lower tax rate on imported and exported goods and services as well as 
free taxes on international trade. It shown by the large percentage of both imports and exports of goods and 
services (43.01 per cent - 48.42 per cent and 38.27 per cent - 50.29 per cent of GDP) while low percentage on 
international trade tax (1.04 per cent and 6.21 per cent of total tax revenue) in both groups of countries. 
The lower fraction of GDP collected in tax revenue among the developing countries does not seem to be a 
result of their choosing lower statutory tax rates. The highest marginal tax rates for both groups of countries 
which shows close same rate (28.67 per cent and 29.86 per cent) proves that tax rates are not determine the 
total tax revenue collected. We suggest the lower fraction of GDP collected by these taxes are influenced by 
ineffective or over optimum level of tax rates which employed by the policy makers as well as lower per 
capita income and less of medium and large companies operated in developing countries compared with the 
high-income OECD countries. 
3.2 Empirical model 
In order to investigate the long-run relationship between tax revenue and economic indicators, the 
following model was used: 
ititit TXy PED  ''                      (2) 
where y represents the economic indicators in the ith country at time t. The economic indicators are y1 = 
GDP, y2 = SAVING, y3 = FDI, y4 = IMPORT, y5 = EXPORT, and y6 = UNEMP. The explanatory variables TX 
consist of the primary components of tax revenue in both groups of countries. 
This study uses several panel unit root tests to determine the order of integration of these variables. We 
adopt the more reliable and well-behaved panel unit root tests such as the Levin et al., 2002; Im et al., 2003, 
and Fisher-type tests proposed by Maddala and Wu, 1999, and  Choi, 2001, that based on augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP). Based on Monte Carlo results, Gutierrez, 2003, reveals that the Kao 
residual cointegration test is outperform Pedroni’s in the case of small time series dimension of the panel. 
Thus, we employ Kao’s, 1999, test to find out the long-run relationship between economic indicators and tax 
structure in both developing and high-income OECD countries. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Panel unit root tests 
The analysis begins with an examination of the integration properties of the panel variables included in 
each model. Table 2 and Table 3 reports panel unit root tests estimate for developing and high-income OECD 
countries.  
As can be seen in Table 2, most of the variables do not exhibit unit roots in level form except for GDP, 
gross saving (SAVING), total tax revenue (TAX) and international trade’s activities (IMPORT and EXPORT) 
in developing countries. The other variables are clearly stationary at levels. For high-income OECD countries, 
the test statistics suggest that GDP, SAVING, EXPORT, unemployment rates (UNEMP) and highest marginal 
tax rates (MTR) have a unit root which implies nonstationary. 
 
Table 2. Results of panel unit root tests for developing countries (levels) 
Variable LLC IPS Fisher (ADF) Fisher (PP) 
GDP 
 
FDI 
 
SAVING 
 
IMPORT 
 
EXPORT 
 
UNEMP 
 
INCOMETX 
 
GOODTX 
 
INTERTX 
 
OTHERTX 
 
MTR 
 
TAX 
6.5667 
(1.0000) 
-11.0128*** 
(0.0001) 
-3.2958*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.1866 
(0.4260) 
8.1096 
(1.0000) 
-8.8227*** 
(0.0001) 
-14.0348*** 
(0.0001) 
-9.3662*** 
(0.0001) 
-14.8936*** 
(0.0001) 
-6.9760*** 
(0.0001) 
-7.7230*** 
(0.0001) 
-9.2710*** 
(0.0001) 
4.1937 
(1.0000) 
-3.1079*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.1795 
(0.4228) 
3.1338 
(0.9991) 
4.1328 
(1.0000) 
-0.6488 
(0.2582) 
-3.3417*** 
(0.0004) 
-2.2133** 
(0.0134) 
-4.7292*** 
(0.0001) 
-7.1559*** 
(0.0001) 
-6.7272*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.7729 
(0.2189) 
40.5287 
(0.7695) 
106.6253*** 
(0.0001) 
72.0726** 
(0.0139) 
19.1866 
(0.9999) 
57.3460 
(0.1672) 
62.0545* 
(0.0836) 
55.2945 
(0.2186) 
74.2398*** 
(0.0089) 
232.9957*** 
(0.0001) 
158.2068*** 
(0.0001) 
125.5580*** 
(0.0001) 
167.9047*** 
(0.0001) 
84.1096*** 
(0.0010) 
42.1148 
(0.7117) 
42.7933 
(0.6855) 
46.6394 
(0.5287) 
101.5032*** 
(0.0001) 
121.7075*** 
(0.0001) 
98.5559*** 
(0.0001) 
96.6076*** 
(0.0001) 
59.9265 
(0.1159) 
209.8110*** 
(0.0001) 
107.7894*** 
(0.0001) 
30.5477 
(0.9766) 
Notes: Values in parentheses are p-values. ***, ** and * indicates rejecting the null hypothesis of non-stationary at 1 per cent, 5 per cent 
and 10 per cent level, respectively. Lag length (2) for LLC and IPS are determined by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), while Fisher-
type tests are based on ADF and Newey-West. Constant and trend terms are included in all tests. The probabilities for the Fisher-type 
tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. 
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Table 3. Results of panel unit root tests for high-income OECD countries (levels) 
Variable LLC IPS Fisher ADF Fisher (PP) 
GDP 
 
FDI 
 
SAVING 
 
IMPORT 
 
EXPORT 
 
UNEMP 
 
INCOMETX 
 
GOODTX 
 
INTERTX 
 
OTHERTX 
 
MTR 
 
TAX 
9.1283 
(1.0000) 
-15.3102*** 
(0.0001) 
-2.4099*** 
(0.0080) 
-15.6247*** 
(0.0001) 
-1.4582* 
(0.0724) 
-6.3876*** 
(0.0001) 
-6.6482*** 
(0.0001) 
-9.3026*** 
(0.0001) 
-15.6904*** 
(0.0001) 
-18.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
-1.5717* 
(0.0580) 
-11.7744*** 
(0.0001) 
4.4477 
(1.0000) 
-7.6608*** 
(0.0001) 
0.8810 
(0.8108) 
-2.6814*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.4503 
(0.3262) 
-1.2383 
(0.1078) 
-2.6093*** 
(0.0045) 
-6.2930*** 
(0.0001) 
-3.5261*** 
(0.0002) 
-29.2528*** 
(0.0001) 
-2.7828*** 
(0.0027) 
-4.2575*** 
(0.0001) 
16.8618 
(1.0000) 
109.6153*** 
(0.0001) 
34.8699 
(0.9217) 
170.5149*** 
(0.0001) 
61.6785* 
(0.0887) 
100.5240*** 
(0.0001) 
134.0164*** 
(0.0001) 
123.0648*** 
(0.0001) 
128.8795*** 
(0.0001) 
156.8512*** 
(0.0001) 
58.0270 
(0.1523) 
179.7928*** 
(0.0001) 
18.1251 
(1.0000) 
251.7210*** 
(0.0001) 
21.7919 
(0.9996) 
16.8397 
(1.0000) 
16.0724 
(1.0000) 
13.9539 
(1.0000) 
133.1705*** 
(0.0001) 
320.0287*** 
(0.0001) 
166.6942*** 
(0.0001) 
250.0910*** 
(0.0001) 
45.0334 
(0.5951) 
112.0622*** 
(0.0001) 
Notes: Values in parentheses are p-values. ***, ** and * indicates rejecting the null hypothesis of non-stationary at 1 per cent, 5 per cent 
and 10 per cent level, respectively. Lag length (2) for LLC and IPS are determined by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), while Fisher-
type tests are based on ADF and Newey-West. Constant and trend terms are included in all tests. The probabilities for the Fisher-type 
tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. 
 
 
The same panel unit root tests were conducted by transforming all variables into first difference as shown 
in Table 4 and Table 5. All the tests show that the variables are stationary at first differences. Hence, we 
conclude that first differenced variables are stationary so that panel variables are integrated of order one, I (1). 
 
Table 4. Results of panel unit root tests for developing countries (first differences) 
Variable LLC IPS Fisher (ADF) Fisher (PP) 
∆GDP 
 
∆FDI 
 
∆SAVING 
 
∆IMPORT 
-4.9211*** 
(0.0001) 
-7.2628*** 
(0.0001) 
-14.4236*** 
(0.0001) 
-23.2940*** 
-3.4282*** 
(0.0003) 
-3.5670*** 
(0.0002) 
-4.6178*** 
(0.0001) 
-7.1240*** 
109.4912*** 
(0.0001) 
129.8614*** 
(0.0001) 
115.1210*** 
(0.0001) 
224.6371*** 
205.1270*** 
(0.0001) 
258.1112*** 
(0.0001) 
294.0464*** 
(0.0001) 
177.7490*** 
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∆EXPORT 
 
∆UNEMP 
 
∆INCOMETX 
 
∆GOODTX 
 
∆INTERTX 
 
∆OTHERTX 
 
∆MTR 
 
∆TAX 
(0.0001) 
-3.7532*** 
(0.0001) 
-7.3975*** 
(0.0001) 
-7.7983*** 
(0.0001) 
-11.6611*** 
(0.0001) 
-1.6091* 
(0.0538) 
-22.5930*** 
(0.0001) 
-17.7742*** 
(0.0001) 
-32.4164*** 
(0.0001) 
(0.0001) 
-2.3534*** 
(0.0093) 
-1.7204** 
(0.0427) 
-8.2617*** 
(0.0001) 
-3.2231*** 
(0.0006) 
-2.9071*** 
(0.0018) 
-10.7147*** 
(0.0001) 
-19.2786*** 
(0.0001) 
-4.2600*** 
(0.0001) 
(0.0001) 
224.3256*** 
(0.0001) 
185.6004*** 
(0.0001) 
184.7822*** 
(0.0001) 
128.5421*** 
(0.0001) 
168.9251*** 
(0.0001) 
112.2902*** 
(0.0001) 
207.7608*** 
(0.0001) 
132.8919*** 
(0.0001) 
(0.0001) 
304.1272*** 
(0.0001) 
163.5356*** 
(0.0001) 
257.1809*** 
(0.0001) 
182.4363*** 
(0.0001) 
220.0657*** 
(0.0001) 
376.3680*** 
(0.0001) 
241.4527*** 
(0.0001) 
149.2815*** 
(0.0001) 
Notes: Values in parentheses are p-values. ***, ** and * indicates rejecting the null hypothesis of non-stationary at 1 per cent, 5 per cent 
and 10 per cent level, respectively. Lag length (2) for LLC and IPS are determined by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), while Fisher-
type tests are based on ADF and Newey-West. Constant and trend terms are included in all tests. The probabilities for the Fisher-type 
tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. 
 
Table 5. Results of panel unit root tests for high-income OECD countries (first differences) 
Variable LLC IPS Fisher ADF Fisher (PP) 
∆GDP 
 
∆FDI 
 
∆SAVING 
 
∆IMPORT 
 
∆EXPORT 
 
∆UNEMP 
 
∆INCOMETX 
 
∆GOODTX 
 
∆INTERTX 
 
-2.2868** 
(0.0111) 
-25.0979*** 
(0.0001) 
-2.4099*** 
(0.0080) 
-10.5704*** 
(0.0001) 
-31.9769*** 
(0.0001) 
-3.5231*** 
(0.0002) 
-6.6482*** 
(0.0001) 
-50.5485*** 
(0.0001) 
-26.8841*** 
(0.0001) 
-4.8950*** 
(0.0001) 
-9.6110*** 
(0.0001) 
-8.3535*** 
(0.0001) 
-12.8486*** 
(0.0001) 
-19.0341*** 
(0.0001) 
-1.7080** 
(0.0438) 
-5.6873*** 
(0.0001) 
-11.5201*** 
(0.0001) 
-10.2352*** 
(0.0001) 
86.1223*** 
(0.0006) 
124.3702*** 
(0.0001) 
94.9162*** 
(0.0001) 
145.0680*** 
(0.0001) 
216.2009*** 
(0.0001) 
63.3259* 
(0.0682) 
124.5280*** 
(0.0001) 
302.7928*** 
(0.0001) 
304.9501*** 
(0.0001) 
140.8643*** 
(0.0001) 
320.0082*** 
(0.0001) 
133.4526*** 
(0.0001) 
77.2090*** 
(0.0047) 
74.9029*** 
(0.0078) 
61.2911* 
(0.0943) 
238.7863*** 
(0.0001) 
333.2551*** 
(0.0001) 
326.9211*** 
(0.0001) 
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∆OTHERTX 
 
∆MTR 
 
∆TAX 
-68.2923*** 
(0.0001) 
-12.5113*** 
(0.0001) 
-31.3783*** 
(0.0001) 
-35.7160*** 
(0.0001) 
-6.7629*** 
(0.0027) 
-28.0632*** 
(0.0001) 
242.4051*** 
(0.0001) 
218.3085*** 
(0.0001) 
416.6218*** 
(0.0001) 
351.3363*** 
(0.0001) 
220.6132*** 
(0.0001) 
241.7080*** 
(0.0001) 
Notes: Values in parentheses are p-values. ***, ** and * indicates rejecting the null hypothesis of non-stationary at 1 per cent, 5 per cent 
and 10 per cent level, respectively. Lag length (2) for LLC and IPS are determined by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), while Fisher-
type tests are based on ADF and Newey-West. Constant and trend terms are included in all tests. The probabilities for the Fisher-type 
tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. 
 
4.2 Panel cointegration analysis 
Since all panel variables are found to be integrated of order one I (1), we can proceed with the panel 
cointegration test using first differenced variables to find out the long-run relationship between tax structure 
and economic indicators. Table 6 exhibits the results of Kao residual cointegration test among the following 
models: ∆GDP, ∆SAVING, ∆FDI, ∆IMPORT, ∆EXPORT and ∆UNEMP. 
 
Table 6. Results of Kao residual cointegration test 
Model Regression Developing Countries High-income OECD Countries 
∆GDP 
 
∆SAVING 
 
∆FDI 
 
∆IMPORT 
 
∆EXPORT 
 
∆UNEMP 
0.9493 
(0.1712) 
-0.5180 
(0.3022) 
-2.0147** 
(0.0220) 
-2.5840*** 
(0.0049) 
-1.4794* 
(0.0695) 
-0.6070 
(0.2719) 
1.4140* 
(0.0787) 
-3.8498*** 
(0.0001) 
-2.0634** 
(0.0195) 
-1.1445 
(0.1262) 
-1.1946 
(0.1161) 
-0.9706 
(0.1659) 
Notes: The value of t-statistic is determined by Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF). Lag length (1) is computed by Newey-West bandwidth 
selection and Bartlett kernel. Values in parentheses are p-values. ***, ** and * indicates rejecting the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
 
 
The test demonstrates mixed results for both groups of countries. The first inspection of Table 6 reveals 
that three main components of economic indicators in developing countries, GDP, gross saving (SAVING) 
and unemployment rate (UNEMP) are failed to reject the null of no cointegration, even at the 10 per cent 
level. Yet, the reported statistics suggest the presence of a strong cointegrating relationship among tax 
structure and international trade’s activities (IMPORT and EXPORT). In contrast, for high-income OECD 
countries, models of GDP and SAVING are succeeds to reject the null of no cointegration at the 10 per cent 
and 1 per cent level. Despite that, Kao’s test suggests that there is no long-run cointegrating relationship 
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between tax structure and imports and exports on goods and services. Nevertheless, test results support a 
cointegration relation among tax structure and net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) for both 
developing and high-income OECD countries. Conversely, there is no evidence of cointegration exists for 
model of UNEMP in both groups of countries. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the long-run equilibrium relationship between components of tax revenue and 
economic indicators. The result based on Kao residual cointegration test reveals that there is an inconsistent 
long-run cointegrating relationship between tax structure and economic indicators for both groups of 
countries. For high-income OECD countries, we find that there is a long-run cointegrating relationship 
between tax structure on three economic indicators (GDP, gross saving and FDI). It indicates that tax policies 
implemented by high-income OECD countries were affecting the movement of long-run growth. 
Nevertheless, the results suggest that there is no evidence of long-run relationship among tax structure and the 
size of international trade. In contrast, for developing countries, the reported statistic shows the presence of 
long-run cointegrating relationship between taxes and international trade, but there is no evidence for GDP 
and gross saving. Thus, the findings in this paper suggests that different tax policies conducted by developing 
countries and high-income OECD countries have given an opposite long-run effect on economic indicators 
among these groups of countries. Additionally, this study concludes that tax can be an important tool to 
recover the current recession or economic slowdown and contribute to long-run growth and international trade 
in both groups of countries. 
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Appendix A. List of countries in sample 
Developing Countries High-income OECD Countries 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Egypt, Arab 
Georgia 
Guatemala 
India 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malaysia 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Tunisia 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Korea Republic 
Luxemburg 
Netherland 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovenia 
Spain 
United States of America 
 
 
